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582 
SPEECH 
We, the Judges, and the Environment 
ANTÔNIO HERMAN BENJAMIN* 
 
It is an honor to open this International Symposium on 
Environmental Courts and Tribunals.  Let me first thank the 
symposium’s organizers, especially Pace University School of 
Law, the International Judicial Institute for Environmental 
Adjudication, the Environmental Law Institute, and other 
institutions involved, for putting forward this timely and 
important initiative. 
I attribute my invitation to speak here today to the fact that 
my country, Brazil, notwithstanding the serious environmental 
degradation and enormous deforestation of the past fifty years, 
continues to be both our planet’s richest reserve of biodiversity 
and, simultaneously, an experimental laboratory with new and 
creative models of environmental legislation, both in terms of 
policy design as well as compliance and enforcement.  I will 
illustrate some of the propositions I make with precedents set by 
the High Court of Brazil (Superior Tribunal de Justiça, or STJ), 
which has issued dozens of decisions that in the past twenty 
years that have changed the face of environmental law in the 
country.  In doing so, I will limit my citations to opinions that I 
wrote for the Court, since a more comprehensive analysis of the 
STJ’s environmental role can be found in the article written by 
Nick Bryner and included in the present issue of this law review. 
 
* Justice, High Court of Brazil (Superior Tribunal de Justiça); Professor, 
Catholic University of Brasília.  Translation by Nicholas S. Bryner. [Editor’s 
Note: This is the text of a speech given at the International Symposium on 
Environmental Courts and Tribunals, hosted by Pace Law School and the 
International Judicial Institute for Environmental Adjudication (IJIEA), on 
April 1, 2011, in White Plains, New York.  Any annotations to the text of this 
speech have been added by the author in connection with its publication in this 
Special Edition]. 
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I will begin with the obvious common ground: we live in an 
era of rapidly disappearing species and ecosystems, a scenario 
made more worrisome by the uncertainties associated with 
climate change.  The very basis of life is under threat.  This 
observation has repercussions for the theme that I have been 
asked to analyze: judges and the environment.  Judges have had 
the final word on how social interactions affect our lives – the 
beginning and the termination of life, family life, life in the 
marketplace, emotional life, and so on.  We have never questioned 
the intervention of courts in these diverse fields of social 
interaction. 
The intellectual task here, then, is to investigate the role of 
judges in the protection of the basis of life itself – the judicial 
concern with the a priori, with the natural planetary systems 
that precede and sustain our everyday existence.  Logical 
reasoning suggests that if it is the judge’s responsibility to 
preserve human life, then it must also be up to the judiciary to 
ensure whatever is necessary to maintain all living beings, 
ourselves and all others — the foundations of life.  Nevertheless, 
we know that judicial intervention in environmental matters, 
despite some success stories around the world, still does not exist 
in many countries.  In some legal systems, courts have merely 
rhetorical or symbolic participation in the implementation of 
environmental laws; in others, their role is questioned; in still 
others, courts are incapable of reducing, much less stopping, the 
extinction of species and the irreversible loss of precious 
ecosystems and biomes. 
It is within this context that I intend to analyze: (a) two 
different models of judicial participation of courts in 
environmental governance; (b) two concrete forms of judicial 
action in resolving environmental conflicts; (c) the challenges to 
judicial practice in this area; and (d) the prospects for the near 
future, a reflection that, of course, will stem from my experience 
as a Brazilian. 
Although it is somewhat of an oversimplification, I believe it 
is possible to identify two broad basic models of judicial protection 
of the environment, based on the types of roles courts play in 
governance of natural resources.  On one side is the spectator 
judiciary, an institutional “non-actor” or peripheral actor in 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/8
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responding to the environmental crisis.  This is the 
environmental laissez-faire approach, in which law and judges 
continue to be seen as tools of the State, used primarily for the 
protection and enforcement of property, contracts, and family 
relationships.  The rest – including the protection of the 
environment – is reserved for public policy and administrative 
discretion, a prohibited territory for judicial exploration, except in 
very limited situations (like nuisance), which are, by definition, 
exceptional.  Of course, we will find no law that says expressly or 
openly that judges must keep away from environmental conflicts.  
The judicial system reaches this result indirectly by maintaining 
the same legal patterns, both substantive and procedural, that 
have guided judges’ practice for centuries. 
There are various arguments – political and technical – put 
forward to suggest that courts should employ this hands-off 
approach in dealing with the environmental crisis.  It can be said 
that environmental conflicts raise legal issues that are too 
complex – take, for example, industrial pollution, groundwater 
contamination, or the difficulty of establishing causation in a 
specific case of species extinction.  The judiciary, goes the 
argument, does not have the necessary resources nor the 
experience to deal with such a high level of scientific and 
technical complexity. 
Proponents of the spectator judiciary may further point out 
that environmental disputes do not always present themselves in 
a crystallized manner so as to fit perfectly in existing legal molds.  
This, it could be argued, would force judges to enter into the 
murky and judicially prohibited waters of political confrontation 
and policymaking, which are the exclusive provinces of other 
state actors – namely, those elected directly by the people – which 
cannot be labeled (as judges can) as democratically illegitimate.  
Finally, environmental conflicts require quick action or response, 
which is incompatible with the slow pace of the court system that, 
due to its bureaucracy and technical rituals, eventually becomes 
an obstacle to effective protection of the environment and to 
economic progress. 
In my view, none of these arguments in defense of the 
spectator judiciary hold water.  Judges, in the course of their 
traditional duties, often deal with complex social and technical 
3
  
2012] JUDGES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 585 
 
questions, such as family conflicts, or uncertainties regarding the 
protection of minors, the elderly, the sick, or those in a coma, who 
may lack the capacity to fully and freely express their consent.  
Judges today are confronted with all sorts of technological 
difficulties while resolving intellectual property disputes.  Yet to 
decide well, a judge need not transform her chambers into a 
university or specialized research institute.  It is precisely for this 
reason that judges have the power to appoint experts or special 
masters to conduct studies, even the most sophisticated ones 
requiring cooperation among various academic fields. 
On the other hand, the slow pace of the judicial process, 
while undeniable, can be corrected or improved with legal and 
management innovations and should not be taken as an 
argument to distance courts from just one single type of conflict – 
environmental.  Finally, undoubtedly, we expect judges 
(especially civil law judges) to respect the fine line between the 
legal and the political.  This again presents no obstacle for the 
courts.  Here we should distinguish between the application of 
legislated public policy and the judicial creation of public policy.  
This distinction was highlighted in a decision of the High Court of 
Brazil: 
In Brazil, unlike other countries, courts do not create obligations 
for environmental protection.  They spring forth from the law, 
after having passed through Parliamentary analysis.  Therefore, 
we do not need activist judges, for the activism is done by the law 
and by the constitutional text. . . . [Fortunately,] our Judiciary is 
not confounded by a sea of gaps or a festival of legislative half-
words.  If a gap exists, it is not due to the lack of a law, nor even 
a defect in the law; it is because of the absence of or a deficiency 
in administrative and judicial implementation of the unequivocal 
environmental duties established by the legislator.1 
As I look around, I believe that, in environmental 
governance, we are increasingly living in the era of the 
protagonist judiciary (something quite different from an activist 
judiciary), or at least moving toward it.  This is the result of a 
series of political and legal developments beginning with the 
 
 1. S.T.J., REsp 650.728/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 23.10.2007, at 15-16 (Braz.). 
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Stockholm Conference in 1972.  First, treaties and international 
documents began requiring States to legislate – and legislate 
effectively – on environmental protection.  As we know well, laws 
are enacted so that they may be enforced – including judicially – 
when violated.  In addition, many countries in the world have 
“greened” their constitutions, raising the stature of 
environmental protection and transforming it from a legal into a 
constitutional paradigm.  This is not, and should not be, a merely 
cosmetic legal change.  Lastly, since the Rio Conference in 1992, 
the international community’s emphasis has moved in the 
direction of compliance and enforcement of environmental policies 
and law. 
Currently, many national constitutions expressly recognize a 
right to a clean and safe environment (the specific terminology 
and language varies significantly among different constitutional 
texts), some going further to attribute an ecological function to 
property rights, as in the case of Brazil and Colombia, for 
example.  Even in countries that only recently embraced 
democracy and the rule of law, after decades of military or civil 
dictatorship, it is considered unacceptable to recognize rights 
without connected duties and, more importantly, without 
agreeing, at least in theory, to the legitimacy of judicial 
intervention in guaranteeing those rights.  Furthermore, in the 
modern world, it is impossible to separate the environment from 
the protection of traditional rights and goods, such as health and 
property.  Nor can we forget that, in the new constitutionalism, 
the rule of law occupies a central place.  And the true rule of law 
cannot exist without ecological sustainability and an independent 
judiciary. 
All this to stress the fact that an environmental hands-off 
court system not only contradicts the needs of our time, but 
fundamentally plays against – a sort of judicial disobedience or 
“negative judicial activism” – the constitutional and legal 
framework put in place.  It becomes clear then that the critique of 
the judicialization of environmental conflicts should have other, 
deeper roots that are perhaps unspoken or less transparent. 
I should begin with possibly the most fundamental and 
controversial aspect of this debate: environmental protection 
redistributes ecological value, and by so doing, redistributes 
5
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economic value as well and reorganizes property rights.  This is 
the redistributive function of environmental law.  Think about 
how the equation of negative environmental externalities is 
reversed when statutes and courts begin to require a polluter to 
install emissions control equipment; or when environmental law, 
as in Brazil, prohibits rural landowners in the Amazon from 
clearing eighty percent of the area of their property.  Basically, 
what the legal system is stating here is that there is an ecological 
function to property rights. In that respect, the High Court of 
Brazil held that: 
  [C]ontemporary judicial regimes require that real properties –  
rural or urban – serve multiple ends (private and public, 
including ecological), which means that their economic utility is 
not exhausted on one single use or the best use, let alone the most 
lucrative use. 
  In truth, the Brazilian constitutional-legal order does not 
guarantee property and business owners the maximum possible 
financial return on private goods and on activities undertaken 
[on real property]. 
  Requirements of ecological sustainability in the pursuit and 
utilization of economic goods are insufficient to show a “taking” 
or an unjustified public intervention into the private domain.  
Requiring individuals to comply with certain environmental 
precautions in the use of their property is not discriminatory, nor 
does it interfere with the principle of equal protection under the 
law, principally because nothing can be confiscated from a person 
if she does not properly own or hold title to it. 
  If landowners and occupiers are subject to the social and 
ecological functions of property, it makes no sense to claim as 
unjust the loss of something that, under the constitutional and 
legal regime in effect, they never had, that is, the possibility of 
complete, absolute use, in scorched-earth style, of the land and 
its natural resources.  Rather, making such claim would be an 
illegal takeover . . . of the public attributes of private property 
(essential ecological processes and services), which are “assets of 
common use” in the terms of the heading to Article 225 of the 
Constitution of 1988.2 
 
 2. S.T.J., REsp 1.109.778/SC (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 10.11.2009, at 5 (Braz.) (emphasis added). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/8
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There is an additional change occurring that affects 
traditional judicial practice – the growth of collective access to 
justice, which implies procedural recognition of new actors that, 
by their nature, diversity, or quantity, are less susceptible to 
manipulation or embarrassment by the environmentally 
degrading state or powerful vested economic interests.  
Furthermore, in federal states, such as Brazil, environmental 
protection is often undertaken by federal courts, which weakens 
and dilutes the power of local elites – and the pernicious 
proximity to, and relationship with the state judiciary to which 
those elites have become accustomed.  In sum, collective 
adjudication reconfigures the individuality of environmental 
harms, bringing not only the diffuse and intergenerational 
components of degradation into play but also making sure that 
Nature itself will not rest without protection. 
When we speak of judicial action in environmental 
protection, we in fact have two things in mind, which should be 
clearly identified and separated.  The more common and less 
controversial function of the courts in environmental law is to 
decide questions of respect, particularly from the state, for the 
formal procedures provided by law.  Here, the judge’s mission is 
fundamentally to ensure a form of environmental due process, 
which includes, for example, reviewing the appropriateness of 
environmental licenses, the completeness of environmental 
impact statements, the holdings of public hearings, and the 
various steps and formalities in the procedure of creating 
protected areas.  This is formal judicial control and, as such, is 
shallow from an ecological perspective. 
More difficult, one could say, is when a court is called on to 
undertake substantive environmental judicial control of 
development projects, in which the judge is expected to – within 
the background of the constitution and the law – weigh options 
and internalize environmental costs.  Here, the judge is called 
upon to intervene in the murky waters in which decisions made 
by administrative authorities and private property owners 
overlap and interact.  The danger is twofold: the judge must be 
careful, on one hand, not to step into territory reserved for elected 
officials; on the other, not to invade the fundamental core of 
private property rights.  Of course, in countries with vast and 
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detailed constitutional and regulatory environmental frameworks 
(like Brazil), the judicial task is less challenging than in 
jurisdictions in which the judge has in front of her only a basket 
of old precedents, ill-equipped to handle issues that go beyond the 
protection of traditional health and property rights of individuals. 
What are the challenges for us judges in the near future?  
One clear difficulty is handling the weight of legislative sources – 
international, national, and, increasingly, municipal – that are 
progressively complex, heterogeneous, and fluid.  Furthermore, 
environmental law is comprised of a number of concepts that 
challenge the very tradition of Western law, based on certainty 
and security, to begin anew with the term “environment.”  In 
addition to this conceptual uncertainty, judges must adapt the 
static character of law to the always-evolving nature of science.  
Take one example: in the context of climate change, is it 
acceptable and reasonable to look at legal rules for environmental 
licensing in the usual way? 
Another aspect to be considered is the still embryonic 
principle of non-regression, a response to the fact that 
environmental legislation in many countries is now waning.  
There is a global struggle to maintain the gains of forty years of 
legislative development.  I see the principle of non-regression as 
an emerging general principle of environmental law, which looks 
ahead, to the future.  Yet courts are often confronted with what 
happened in the past (and not just the near past), especially in 
countries that enacted environmental legislation as far back as 
the 1960s but lacked the political will or human and financial 
capacity to implement it.  Such is the case of the Brazilian Forest 
Code of 1965.  The question here is what to do with those that 
have been violating the law for decades, an issue that was 
brought to the High Court of Brazil, which held: 
  There exists no acquired right to pollute or degrade the 
environment.  The passage of time cannot cure environmental 
violations of a permanent nature, because some parties affected 
by such actions – future generations – have neither a voice nor 
representatives authorized to speak or remain silent in their 
name. 
  Decades of illicit use of the rural property do not provide safe 
harbor for the landowner or occupant to continue prohibited acts; 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss2/8
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nor do they legalize acts prohibited by statute, above all in the 
area of inalienable rights, which all enjoy, including future 
generations, as is the case of environmental protection.3 
The courts, however, will not be able to protect the 
environment unless there is a strong cultural desire to do so as 
well.  Changing the law is one thing, but transforming centuries-
old, deeply-rooted cultural traditions would be challenging for any 
judicial regime or nation.  This point did not go unnoticed in a 
precedent issued by the High Court of Brazil: 
In Brazil, “knocking down” and “replacing the old with the new” 
have always been the order of the day, in the city and in the 
fields.  In the spirit of the Brazilian, carved out over 500 years of 
historical conquest of the natural and of the old, progress 
becomes synonymous with denying the value and legitimacy of 
the past and the future, such that our “immediatism” only allows 
us to recognize the identity, legitimacy, and necessities of the 
present.  As such, the natural tendency is to reject, disbelieve, or 
obstruct any legal regime that stands in the way of tractors, 
cranes, dynamite, chainsaws . . . .4 
I conclude today by citing another precedent of the High 
Court of Brazil.  The main issue in this case was the validity of 
the private conservation easement clauses put in building 
contracts at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, an urban 
planning case whose wording fits perfectly within the realm of 
nature conservation: 
Although courts do not design, build or administer cities, that 
does not mean they cannot do anything for them.  No judge, no 
matter how great her interest in, knowledge of, or ability in the 
art of urban planning, architecture and landscape, will take upon 
herself anything beyond the simple role of engineering the legal 
discourse.  And, as we know, cities will not rise or evolve with 
words alone.  But words spoken by judges can indeed encourage 
destruction or legitimize conservation, endorse speculation or 
guarantee urban environmental quality, consolidate the errors of 
 
 3. S.T.J., REsp 948.921/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 23.10.2007, at 1 (Braz.). 
 4. S.T.J., REsp 840.918/DF (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Eliana Calmon, 
14.10.2008, at 32 (Majority Opinion of Min. Antonio Herman Benjamin) (Braz.). 
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the past, repeat them in the present, or enable a sustainable 
future.5 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
 5. S.T.J., REsp 302.906/SP (2d Panel), Relator: Min. Antonio Herman 
Benjamin, 26.08.2010, at 4 (Braz.). 
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